








3. The process of choice in games∗
Giorgio Coricelli, Luca Polonio and Alexander Vostroknutov
RESPONSE TIME AND STRATEGIC CHOICE
The study of response times (RTs) has a long history in experimentalpsychology going back
to Donders (1868) who was interested in measuring the time that a particul r hypothetical
mental stage involved in a task can take. This was when the idea that response time can
help to infer the mental processes behind psychological phenomena took root (Luce 1991).
Since then ‘mental chronometry’ (Jensen 2006) was used by psychologiststoge her with the
choice or survey data to make inferences about the processes underlying choices or to analyze
behavior under time pressure. As it was recently stated by Ariel Rubinstein (2007, 2016),
measuring response time allows us to ‘open the black box of decision making’ (Rubinstein
2007, p. 1243). The same sentiment is shared in a thorough review ofrecent experimental
economics studies that use RTs (Spiliopoulos and Ortmann 2018).
In spite of the view that RT can be utilized not only in testing hypotheses related to the
process of choice but also in order to better understand preferences (Konovalov and Krajbich
2019a), its usage in experimental and behavioral economics was limited, ifexistent, until very
recently (a known exception is Wilcox 1993). The tide started to change with the advances
in models of procedural rationality and studies of strategic sophistication and deliberation
costs (starting with Stahl and Wilson 1994, 1995 and Nagel 1995), which made RT a natural
candidate for a choice characteristic that allows uncovering of the details ofthe decision
process under the assumptions of bounded rationality. Another reason for the introduction of
RT to experimental economics is the emergence of neuroeconomics, which has brought many
psychological and neuroscientific research tools to light, including mental chronometry.
Response Time in the Models of Decision Process in Games
There are two broad classes of models which make explicit predictions aboutthe RT of choice.
The first is dual-process theories (DPTs) (Kahneman 2003), which assumethe presence of
two decision systems: fast intuitive system and slow deliberative syst m. The former system
(type 1) is useful in situations when decisions should be made instantaneously. It involves
‘hot’, emotional responses and has most likely evolved to make choices in rapidly changing
situations. The latter system (type 2) is slower and ‘cold; and is helpful in situations when
there is no time pressure and complex reasoning can help to make the choice.
The second class of theories comes under the titles of sequential sampling, information
accumulation or drift-diffusion models (DDMs) (Ratcliff 1978; Smith and Ratcliff 2004;
Krajbich et al. 2015a). Here the process of choice among several options is explicitly modeled
as a random process. The idea comes from the neurophysiological observation th neurons
in the brain are noisy and, thus, as information about the available options is accumulated, the
more desirable option is chosen with higher probability. Mathematically this is represented by
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of one of the barriers by the random walk represents the time point of making the choice
(A or B). Here the steeper the drift, the higher the difference in utilities of the two options;
the greater the difference in utilities, the faster the choice will be made.In models of this type
it is possible to make explicit predictions about the speed–accuracy trade-off involved in a
decision. If the time available for choice is limited (exogenously orendogenously), then the
resulting choice will be fast but not very accurate. However, if the time is not constrained, the
decision will be slow and the probability of choosing the best option will be high.
The two classes of models raise different questions and utilize differenttypes of data. Both
are also subject to criticism. According to Keren and Schul (2009), dual-process theories
are never precisely formulated: what type 1 and type 2 systems are supposedto represent
in any given task is usually decided by the researcher, who uses his or her own intuition
without resorting to any objective procedure. This can lead to far-fetched conclusions which
ignore other possible explanations. Rustichini (2008) providesan overview of pros and cons
of dual-process theories and unitary theories, where the latter assume thatthere is only one
system that makes decisions by aggregating information available from different sources. He
comes to a conclusion, similar to that of Keren and Schul (2009), that one caveat of the dual-
process theories is that the characteristics of the type 1 and 2 systems changedepending on
the experiment (for example, in some instances the type 1 system is impuls ve and in others
reactive to fear).
Drift-diffusion models are criticized for putting too much emphasis on speed–accuracy
trade-off. For example, Pennycook et al. (2016) notes that in choice situations where there is
conflict (for example, when the stereotype is not in line with base-rate information; De Neys
and Glumicic 2008), the RT, if seen in the light of DDMs, might be misinterpreted since RT
increases when conflict is introduced even if discriminability of the options stays the same.
Thus, RT might be modulated not only by the discriminability of the options but also by other
factors.
Studies Based on Dual-Process Theories
One of the most cited but, at the same time, controversial studies of strategic choice that
tests hypotheses based on dual-process theory is Rand et al. (2012). Their study u es a
series of standard one-shot public goods (PG) games with four players in o der to establish
a connection between RT and the contributions to the public good (data were collected on
Amazon Mechanical Turk). With the sample of 212 subjects, Rand et al. (2012)find that high
contributions are associated with low RT and low contributions with hig RT (RT is measured
as the time between the appearance of the decision task on the screen and the submitt d
answer). In addition, if RT is forced to be low (time pressure) then contributions tend to be
high. Conversely, if RT is forced to be high (time delay), the contribu ions are low. Rand et al.
(2012) conclude that cooperative behavior is intuitive and that the choice t free ride takes
mental effort and time.
The results of this study came under close scrutiny after its publication. Tinghög et al.
(2013) and Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) both failed to replicate the rsults from Rand
et al. (2012). These authors noted aberrations with data analysis (the exclusion of 50 percent
of subjects from analysis based on their inability to respond on time) andthe presence of many
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Another line of critique comes from experimental economics studies. Recalde et al. (2018)
tested the main conclusion of Rand et al. (2012), that generosity in PG gamesis intuitive.
Recalde et al. (2018) used modified PG games in which unique dominant strategy equilibrium
is in the interior of the action space for each player.1 They showed that in this case fast
decision makers’ choices are not influenced by the position of the equilibri m. This implies
that for the PG games with equilibria in the lower half of the action spacefast decision makers
tend to be more generous than slow decision makers. However, if equilibrium is in the upper
half of the action space, fast decision makers become less generous than the slowd cision
makers. This and additional tests make Recalde et al. conclude that the choices offast decision
makers are best explained by mistakes (including the prevalence of choices ofthe actions
which are dominated from both individual and group perspectives) and are not driven by
intuitive generosity. Similar conclusions about mistakes are reached in anexperimental study
that considers beauty contests (Kocher and Sutter 2006). Here, fast decision makers are less
efficient and are slower to reach equilibrium in the repeated setting which is also attributed to
higher mistake rates.2
In spite of this criticism, other studies support the intuitive cooperation hypothesis.
Cappelen et al. (2016) examine response times in the dictator game (DG) with careful
control over the factors that might influence RT. In particular, Cappelen et al. (2016) conduct
additional tests on swiftness of choice and cognitive ability. Swiftness is measured by the
time it takes subjects to answer three standard demographic questions. Cognitive ability is
measured by a 20-item progressive Raven test. Cappelen et al. (2016) come tothe conclusion
that, after controlling for swiftness and cognitive ability, the cooperators are still faster than
free riders. Nielsen et al. (2014) obtain the same result with a large-scalePG game and
conclude that free riders act slower than cooperators. It should be mentiond that these two
studies are not immune to the ‘fast decision makers make more mistakes’ critique discussed
above. Moreover, the results for the DG should be considered with caution: Tinghög et al.
(2016) conducted large-scale experiments with around 1400 subjects fromth ee countries
and did not find any differences in giving choices in DGs under time pressuror cognitive
load, which casts doubts on the findings of Cappelen et al. (2016).
Grimm and Mengel (2011) look at ultimatum game (UG), where they deliberately delay
the response of the second movers by around 10 minutes (the subjects answer questionnaire
before their response decisions). They find that after the delay there are many more accepting
choices than in standard setting. This does not per se support the intuitive cooperation
hypothesis, but does demonstrate that rejections in UG do result from fast emotional reaction
that has to be expressed immediately after observing the choice of the propose . In this setting,
where only two actions are available, the change in behavior can hardly be attributed to
the mistakes made by fast decision makers. These findings, thus, support the dual-process
theory.
Nishi et al. (2017) extend the intuitive cooperation hypothesis in afollow-up experiment
to Rand et al. (2012) in part as a response to the criticism just mentioned. Nishi et al. (2017)
put forward the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH) which postulates that people are fast at
choosing options that they use in everyday life, be they cooperative or not. In the environments
where reputation plays a role, cooperative behavior might be ubiquitous ( r constitute a
social norm), while selfish choices are uncommon. On the contrary, in environments where
selfishness is a norm, cooperative choices will be considered unusual.3 Thus, from the
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representing a norm is chosen and slow deliberative reaction when an action which violates a
norm is preferred.
Nishi et al. (2017) conduct repeated social network PG games experiments in the US and
India (using Amazon Mechanical Turk). First, they find that overall cooperation rate in the US
is significantly higher than in India (75 percent versus 44 percent in the neutral environment,
and 88 percent versus 37 percent in the cooperative environment), which suggests that the
common behavior is different in the two countries (cooperation in the US and defection in
India). Second, Nishi et al. (2017) show that the negative correlation between cooperative
choices and response times in the US is reversed in India: selfish choices are made faster there.
These findings directly support the SHH and provide evidence of the primary role of social
norms in decision making. However, completely different interpretationof the differences
between the American and Indian data is possible if RT is considered in the light of DDMs,
which we turn to in the following section.
Studies Based on Drift-Diffusion Models
Not many studies of strategic choice utilize DDM as the hypothesis-generati g theory. Drift-
diffusion models were originally used in perception studies in order to predict how the
perceptual systems in the brain discriminate between two visual stimuli.Later, these models
were adapted to studying individual choice. Many studies have demonstrated a remarkably
good fit of DDM to the binary value-based choices, in particular, the resolution of speed–
accuracy trade-off was shown to be matched very well (for example, Milosavljevic et al. 2010
fit DDM to the value-based decision-making data under time pressure). This literature is still
in its infancy and not many attempts have been made to apply DDM to strategic situations.
Nevertheless, Krajbich et al. (2015b) used DDM to clarify the connection between RT and
choices in DGs and PG games. In part, their goal was to show that the conclusios ab ut
RT in strategic environments made under the assumptions of dual-process theories should
be taken with caution. They conducted several experiments to show that reverse inference
results, which label, say, cooperative behavior as intuitive based on short RT, might be an
artifact of the experimental design. Their argument, derived from DDM, involves the notion
of discriminability: the less is the difference in utilities from the available options, the longer
the choice process will take. Krajbich et al. (2015b) conducted an experiment wh re subjects
were presented with a series of mini DGs that varied in the amount of moneya subject should
have sacrificed in order to increase the payoff of the receiver. To estimate thediffer nce of the
values derived from the choices, Krajbich et al. (2015b) fitted inequality-averse utility function
to the choices of each subject. It follows directly from DDM that pro-socialsubjects should
make their preferred choice (more money to the receiver) quicker than the selfish choice. The
opposite holds for selfish subjects: they should make their preferredselfish choice quicker.
The data of Krajbich et al. (2015b) support DDM predictions: the correlation of the RT with
the pro-social choice has opposite signs for pro-social and selfish subjects. Thus, in an exper-
iment, where RT for choosing selfish or pro-social actions are compared, the faster RT will be
found for the action which is chosen more often. For example, if there aremo selfish than
pro-social subjects in the experiment, the selfish choice will have a shorter RT and vice versa.
Krajbich et al. (2015b) use this intuition to revisit the results of Rand et al. (2012). They run
the same public goods experiment, but consider three levels of the marginal per capita return






































0.3 Fast 0.3 Slow 0.5 Fast 0.5 Slow 0.9 Fast 0.9 Slow
Note: Consistent with DDM, in low return condition fast contributions are lower than slow ones (two-sided
t-test,p = 0.00001), while in the high return condition fast contribut ons are higher than slow ones (two-sided
t-test,p = 0.03).
Source: Krajbich et al. (Krajbich et al. 2015b, fig. 3.4).
Figure 3.1 Average contributions to public good in three experiments with different
marginal per capita returns (MPCR = 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9)
with the low return the selfish option is faster than the cooperative option, whereas with the
high return the cooperative option is faster (as in Rand et al. 2012).
Thus, Krajbich et al. (2015b) conclude that, in line with DDM, the distance in utilities of
the two options and the composition of the subject pool determine which type of action is
faster: if a great deal of monetary units have to be forgone in order to increase group payoff,
selfish choices will be faster as selfish subjects will find it easier to make this choice. On the
contrary, if few monetary units should be forgone to increase group welfare, pro-social action
will be faster since it will be simpler for pro-social subjects to choose.
Finally, DDM interpretation of the data might also explain the difference in RT observed
in Nishi et al. (2017), discussed previously. The Indian population seems to have more selfish
types than the American population, thus, according to the argument above,we should expect
faster RT for selfish action in India and faster RT for pro-social action in the US, exactly what
was found in Nishi et al. (2017).
Studies Based on Response Competition Dual-Process Theories
Some researchers note that although the DPT critique of Krajbich et al. (2015b) is on target,
it completely ignores the diversity of models and approaches in DPT literatur nd, thus, the
results of Krajbich et al. (2015b) should not be taken as an ultimate falsific tion of DPT. In
particular, the arguments of Krajbich et al. (2015b) go against the (inverse inference) practice
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Pennycook et al. (2016) observe, there exist other types of DPT which are not at all concerned
with the intuition–deliberation dichotomy. A great deal of attention has been paid to the idea of
the competition or conflict between two systems for the right to make a choice.4 For example,
in base-rate problems a conflict is artificially created between the overwhelminginformation
that someone, say Paul, is a nurse and his stereotypical look of a doctor. In these studies (for
example, De Neys and Glumicic 2008) it is shown that, in guessing whoPaul actually is, the
majority of subjects go with the stereotype and that the RT in the problems with conflict is
longer than in the problems without it no matter what action is eventually chosen. Response
competition DPT gives an answer to the question of why RTs are longer: the conflict between
two systems causes the type 2 deliberative processing.
This type of effects on RT is not necessarily inconsistent with DDM. Theidea of a conflict
between options is investigated in at least two studies which involve strategic interactions.
Evans et al. (2015) conducted several experiments with one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and
one-shot and repeated PG games. They found that RTs follow the inverted-Upattern, namely,
extremely selfish and extremely cooperative choices were fast, whereas choices in between
the two extremes were slow. In addition, unlike in Rand et al. (2012),this effect did not
disappear with repetition. Response competition DPT explains these results a a consequence
of a conflict between a system that advocates selfish choice and a system that prescribes
cooperation. When one of the two systems is dominating, the conflict isquickly resolved,
while it takes longer for the resolution when the two systems are of comparable strength.
Furthermore, these findings are exactly in line with the argument of Krajbich et al. (2015b),
which stipulates that subjects with extreme preferences for either selfishness or pro-sociality
should make decisions faster than those with mixed preferences.
Similar results are reported by Piovesan and Wengström (2009), who measure RTs in a
sequence of mini DGs played by each subject. The DGs varied in the degree of inequality
of the allocations and whether a dictator was rich or poor (dictators were getting more or
less money than receivers). Piovesan and Wengström (2009) found that RT was correlated
with the social complexity of the choice: selfish choices were reached faster thanchoices
that necessitated social considerations.5 In addition, it took poor subjects longer to reach the
decision than rich subjects, which suggests the involvement of envy in the decisions. All this
taken together supports the conflict resolution hypothesis of longer RTs.
Inferences Using Reaction Time
The studies mentioned up to this point were mostly concerned with the consistency of
theoretical accounts with observed data. There is, however, a growing literatur where an
attempt is made to use RTs as signals of decision makers’ characteristics. These studies can be
divided into two categories: (1) RTs are used by experimenters to infer subjects’ preferences;
and (2) RTs are used by subjects to infer others’ motives or as signals revealing private
information.
In the first category are the studies by Rubinstein (2007, 2013, 2016), who used the unique
dataset with tens of thousands of observations obtained from http://gametheory.tau.ac.il
(accessed 9 July 2020). It was used to create a typology of subjects using the r RTs in 10
games. Later, the predictive power of this typology was investigated on aset of unrelated
games. First, a very large number of anonymous observations (2000 to 13 000 subjects in
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mean RTs of the actions taken in the 10 games (eight normal form games and two extensive
form: ultimatum and centipede). The RTs then were divided into two categories: below median
and above median. The actions with below-median mean RTs were labeled instinctve and
those with above-median mean RTs contemplative (notice that the procedureis completely
objective and does not involve any ad hoc assumptions). Next, a series of experiments was
conducted where subjects played the same 10 games. The contemplation index (CI) for each
subject was calculated as a proportion of games in which a subject took a contemplative
action. It was then demonstrated that, in a set of unrelated games, there was a correl tion
between action choices and CI of the subjects even when the mean RTs of the choices wher
not significantly different. This shows that the division of the subjects in accordance with
their choosing instinctive or contemplative actions can predict their choices in unrelated
games.
In another study Konovalov and Krajbich (2019b) use RT information tinfer sub-
jects’ individual preferences. They use the insight from DDM that difficult choices (low
discriminability) should be slower than easy choices (high discriminability). To validate
this premise, Konovalov and Krajbich (2019b) collected data in three choiceexp riments
including one with a sequence of mini DGs with varying payoff allocations (akin to Piovesan
and Wengström 2009). From the data, the utility function parameters were first estimated for
each subject (for DG, the parameters of the utility function with inequality version). Then, for
each choice task of each subject, the difference between the utility parameter of thesubject
and the parameter which would make the utilities of the options the samewas calculated
and treated as a measure of task complexity for that subject: if the absolutediffer nce was
small the task was deemed complicated; if the absolute difference was large, thetask was
considered easy. Konovalov and Krajbich showed that the difficulty of the tasks measured in
this way was strongly correlated with the RT: difficult tasks took longer (Figure 3.2 illustrates
this).
In the next step, Konovalov and Krajbich (2019b) demonstrated that information about RT
can be successfully used to deduce preferences even with very little data. They showed that the
utility parameter inferred from a single choice and RT was a good predictorof he subsequent
choices. In addition, RTs allowed for the identification of preferences fromchoice tasks where
the majority or all subjects chose the same option. Overall, this study demonstrates the great
potential of using RTs in decision making experiments.
Two studies utilize RTs in order to test the hypothesis that subjects are able to use infor-
mation that RTs convey about other players’ unobserved preferences or private information.
Frydman and Krajbich (2019) investigate choices in a classical informationcascade task in
two conditions, with and without subjects’ observing RT of the previous player. They make
two important observations: (1) from the perspective of DDM, RTs ininformation cascade
do deliver additional information about the private signal of a player when her choice is in
line with the cascade’s history of choices; (2) subjects in the experimentar able to use this
information contained in RT to correctly infer the private signal. The first observation builds
upon the following argument. Conditional on player’s choice to be inline with the majority,
when his or her private signal is congruent with the previous choices, th decision is easy and
should be made quickly. When, however, the private signal is incongruent, the choice is hard
and should take longer. Therefore, RT reveals information about the private signal. Frydman
and Krajbich (2019) showed that the subjects could extract this information from the RT and
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Note: The inequality-averse social preferences parametersα andβ were estimated for each subject (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999), whereα parametrizes the disutility from disadvantageous inequality ndβ the disutility from
advantageous inequality. After that, indifferenceα andβ were calculated for each game, that is,α andβ made the
utility from both options the same. For each game and a particular hoice, the absolute difference between subject’s
parameters and the indifference parameters was taken as a measure of the choice complexity. The graphs
demonstrate that RT increases as the subjects’ preferencesget closer to indifference.
Source: Konovalov and Krajbich (2019b, fig. 10.2).
Figure 3.2 Subjects made 120 choices in a series of mini DGs with two opti ns
Evans and van de Calseyde (2017) follow one of the studies discussed above (Evans et al.
2015) and investigate what type of information about others subjects are able to infer from
observing RTs. They use the data previously collected in a PG game experiment to tell
subjects the RTs of choices and then ask them to evaluate the motives of the players on
several Likert scales. Evans and van de Calseyde (2017) find that short RTsare a sociated
in subjects’ minds with the extreme choices, either full or zero contribution, and long RTs
with intermediate contributions. This is in line with the actual behavior reported in Evans
et al. (2015). More interestingly, when the subjects were told that theplayers in the actual
PG game were exogenously time constrained, the responses became mixed without any clear
pattern. These findings indicate that RTs, when unconstrained, can be informative about the
incentives and the choice process of others in social dilemmas.
EYE AND MOUSE MOVEMENTS DATA IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Visual Attention in Eye-Tracking and Mouse-Lab Paradigms
The primary purpose of the visual process is to derive meaning from the world in order to
direct our actions. This is a dynamic process that is conducted by the brainth ough the
visual system and in which attention plays a crucial role. According to Duchowski (2007),
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stimulus such as an image is observed by a person for the first time, attention is usually driven
by the characteristics of the visual scene. This is termed bottom-up attention, in which an
individual starts observing the entire scene through a low-resolution peripheral vision while
the important elements of the scene are captured in the field of view. In thefirst stage, the
features that are considered interesting are selected for a subsequent, deeper analysis. The
second stage includes disengagement of the attention from the less attractive elements and
the repositioning of the eyes to capture the stimuli that most attracted the attention (selective
attention). Finally, when the fovea is repositioned to the area that attrcted the most attention,
all the features of these regions of interest can be inspected at high resolution. This is a
bottom-up model of visual attention that does not take into account the situations where
the eye movements are guided by the voluntary intention to capture or attend to a specific
part of the scene. In this regard, Yarbus (1967) highlighted the roleof top-down factors in
modulating the eye movement patterns used by the observer to acquire information from a
scene. When a stimulus, such as an image, is observed by a person for the firsttime, the eye
movements should be driven by bottom-up processes. Conversely, top-down factors should
have a prominent role in modulating the patterns of eye-movement as soon a the individual
becomes more familiar with the stimulus.
That attention can be mediated by bottom-up or top-down mechanisms has important impli-
cations for the interpretation of the process data because an observed information search pat-
tern may be the result of a predetermined information search strategy (top-down analysis) or
mainly determined by some features of the visual scene (bottom-up analysis). In eye-tracking
experiments, the characteristics of the task and of the decision maker may significantly affect
how attention is allocated in a visual scene. For example, a bottom-up analysis may be
promoted by the presence of attractors or focal points (Devetag et al. 2016). Conversely, the
adoption of routines may promote a more stable and systematic visual analysis.
In classical mouse-laboratory experiments, features of the scene, such as focal points and
attractors, cannot drive attention because the information (presented on acomputer screen)
is hidden in opaque boxes and can be revealed only using the mouse pointer(F gure 3.3).
The way in which information is revealed in a typical mouse-laboratory study can be set by
the experimenter and varies depending on the type of task and the object of study. For example,
information can be revealed (1) when the pointer is moved into the box, (2) when the pointer
is moved into the box and the left button of the mouse is pressed, or (3) when the pointer is
moved into the box and the left button is held down. Mouse-laboratorytechniques can provide
high-resolution temporal data about the location of the pointer (in terms of pixels) and many
other analysis metrics such as the number of times a certain box is opened and for how l ng.
In addition, more advanced mouse-tracking techniques can retrace the mouse’s trajectories,
and examine velocity and acceleration.6 In general, using a mouse-laboratory paradigm a
researcher can understand how, when and what information is processed by the participant,
and how the decision processes evolve over time.
Some studies have noted that the mouse-laboratory paradigm may itself hav an effect
on the information search process (Billings and Marcus 1983; Maule, 1994; Lohse and
Johnson 1996; Glöckner and Betsch 2008; Franco-Watkins and Johnson 2011). For example,
attention cannot be affected by peripheral information, and the way it is allocated in a given
visual scene is largely based on top-down processes. Glöckner and Betsch (2008) argue that
this research method, in some instances, promotes deliberation and prevents the activation of
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Final payoff is determined by both players’ choices.






















Please make your choice!
S/He : @ S/He : & S/He : @
You want to choose #
You want to choose *
OK
Note: In this example, participants (the row players, You) can seeth payoffs by moving the cursor over the boxes.
The payoffs of the participants (Your points) are located inthe two left-most columns. The payoffs of the
counterpart (Her/his points) in the two right-most columns. It is possible for the participant to have only one box
open at a time. When the participant move the cursor outside the opaque area, the box closes automatically.
Source: Adapted from Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2018).
Figure 3.3 Mouse-laboratory screenshot of a two by two one-shot game
increases the amount of time needed to acquire information compared with theeye-tracking
method. In eye-tracking paradigms a participant can acquire information ina more natural
way, whereas in mouse-laboratory paradigms the participant is induced to beengaged in a
serial consideration of information. Unfortunately, the use of eye-tracking apparatus is usually
costly and the data collection is limited to one participant at a time, whichmakes mouse
laboratory a viable alternative despite its drawbacks.
Eye-Tracking System
The eye-tracking system measures the point of gaze (where a subject is looking) and the
motion of one or both eyes relative to the head position. The standardsampling rate of
an eye-tracker varies from a minimum of 60 Hz, to a maximum of 2000 Hz. Modern eye-
trackers identify eye movements and gaze locations by using the contrast between the center
of the pupil and the iris. Moreover, they can create a corneal reflection usingan infrared non-
collimated light. The system creates a vector using these two features and, after a calibration
procedure, computes gaze intersection with a surface.
Common analysis metrics include fixations location and their duration, saccades directions,
velocities and amplitudes, smooth pursuit and transitions-based paramete s b ween fixations
and/or region of interest. Eye-tracking systems also allow to measure how much pupils dilate
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Note: The background image is the game shown to the participant. The circles indicate the areas of interest
defined by the experimenter for the analysis of the eye-tracking data. The small circles indicate the fixation
locations (the size of the circle is proportional to the fixation duration), whereas a number next to a circle
indicates the fixation duration. Lines indicate the saccades, and the arrows indicate their directions.
Figure 3.4 This example shows the event data, such as fixations andsaccades of a row
player, recorded during a trial of a two-player, three-by-three, normalform
game
and expressed interest. During fixations, the eyes extract informationfrom the visual scene for
further processing. During saccades, visual perception is suppressed (Matin 1974); however,
differences in speed and accuracy of the eye saccades can affect the amount and the quality
of information processed. Smooth pursuit eye movements allow the eyes to keep the visual
projection of a moving object continuously on the center of the fovea.
In general, eye-tracking data provide information about which elements ofthe visual scene
participants take into account, how long they look at a certain areas of interest (AOI), and in
what order they look at the available information. Figure 3.4 describes the main parameters
that can be acquired by using an eye-tracking device. The circles represent the AOIs, defined
by the experimenter to identify when the participant is looking at one particular visual element
on the screen. The definition of the AOIs is important to allow a detailedexamination of events
data such as fixations and saccades (represented by small circles and lines respectively). Areas
of interest are sub-regions of the displayed stimuli that can be used tounderstand whether a
respondent is acquiring certain information. They can also be used to measure how much time
passed from stimulus onset until respondents looked into the region (time to first fixation),
how much time the respondents spent in the region, how many fixationsthey had, and the





























Note: This example shows the data on fixation duration of a respondent playing a series of three-by-three matrix
games. The example shows that the respondent (row player) focuses his or her attention on his or her own payoffs
and does not take into account the payoffs of the counterpart(column player).
Figure 3.5 Data on fixation counts and fixation durations can be visual zed using heat maps
possible to generate heat maps of fixation densities for single respondent as well as for a full
study of several respondents (Figure 3.5). Eye-tracking heat maps are aggreg tions of fixations
that reveal the distribution of visual attention. This is an excellent method to visualize which
elements attract more attention than others.
The analysis of eye-tracking data can provide a lot of information aboutattentional and
cognitive aspects of decision making and can help researchers in the evaluation of lternative
theories. For example, a decision-making process that requires the acquisition of particular
information, cannot be pursued when this information is not acquired (Johnson and Camerer
2004). At the same time, there is plenty of evidence showing that the ord r f information
acquisition (the lookup pattern) is informative of the decision rule adopted and predictive of
the decision (Johnson et al. 2002; Polonio et al. 2015).
Decision-making processes can be investigated also measuring the length of fixati n and the
pupil dilation. For example, longer fixations are associated with cognitive difficulty, such as
deliberate consideration of information and planning (Velichkovsky 1999; Velichkovsky et al.
2002; Glöckner and Herbold 2011; Graffeo et al. 2015). Short fixations are typically related
to simpler processes of visual perception, such as exploration of the environment (Figure 3.6).
Pupil dilation is an index of cognitive difficulty, stress, arousal and pain, which has
been extensively used in the lie detection literature to infer deceptive behavior (Berrien and
Huntington 1943; Janisse 1973; Heilveil 1976; Bradley and Janisse1979, 1981; Janisse and
Bradley 1980; Lubow and Fein 1996; Dionisio et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2010). Hess (1972)
reported that pupil dilation occurs between 2 and 7 seconds after the presentation of emotional



















Note: In this example, an identical product was on sale in two shopswith different initial prices and discounts. The
respondents were asked to choose the best option. The size ofth circles indicates the length of fixations, the lines
indicate the saccades. A correct procedure to compute the final prices requires the decision makers to compare, for
each option, the initial price with the associated discountand engage in a mental calculation. The left-hand side of
the figure shows eye movements of a respondent who used a simple comparison procedure to choose between the
two shops. When one of the alternatives yielded a higher discount with a lower initial price, this decision maker
chose that option. Alternatively, when one option yielded higher discount and another option lower initial price, the
respondent selected the option with the higher discount. This simple decision strategy did not require long fixations.
The right-hand side of the figure shows eye movements of a respondent who engaged in the calculation of the final
prices. This complex cognitive operation required the respondent to keep the gaze on the most relevant information
(the initial price) until the end of the mental calculation.
Source: Adapted from Graffeo et al. (2015).
Figure 3.6 Eye movements of two respondents while making a decision to purchase a
product
trial onset (Beatty 1982) and contracts gradually (Kahneman and Beatty 1966) or instantly
(Bernhardt et al. 1996) once the response is made.
In the following we take a more detailed look at how mouse laboratory and eye tracking
can be used to inform economic theories. In particular, we focus on how process data can help
to test different game-theoretic models.
The Relevance of Process Data for the Evaluation of Different Theories
A fundamental question in game theory is why players sometimes deviate from equilibrium
strategies, especially in situations where players do not have clear precedents (one-shot
games). Many theories of bounded rationality were developed in an attempt toprovide more
accurate predictions of players’ behavior than those provided by equilibri m analysis alone.
Some studies have begun to evaluate these theories by combining informati n about process
data with observed choices. The advantage of using process data is clear, sincebou d d
rationality theories make precise assumptions about processes or factors that lead to out-
of-equilibrium decisions. For example, McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1995) quantal response
equilibrium (QRE) relaxes optimization, but maintains the assumption of correct beliefs. The
model assumes that players form accurate beliefs about the expected action of their opponent,
but best responses are not played with certainty because players respond noisily to expected
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the distribution of actions chosen by other players, but sometimes deviate from equilibrium
because they do not fully take into account the correlation between others’ deci ions and
private information (Eyster and Rabin 2005). The validity of the assumptions of these two
theories can be tested in terms of information acquisition. For example, it can be tested
whether players are able to acquire all the relevant information necessary to form (accurate)
beliefs about the expected actions of other players or to estimate the distribut on of actions
chosen by others.
Other bounded rationality models of strategic behavior, such as level-k (Stahl and Wilson
1994, 1995; Nagel 1995; Crawford 2003) and cognitive hierarchy (Ho etal. 1998; Camerer
et al. 2004) explain out-of-equilibrium outcomes by assuming that individuals perform
different and limited levels of iterative strategic thinking owing to limited cognitive capacities.
For information acquisition, we may expect that agents do not play equilibri m because they
fail to process relevant information. Hence, to test these theories we should verify whether
players exhibit information search patterns that are consistent with their lev l-k.
A different picture is that proposed by the theories of social preferences. Acording to these
theories, deviations from equilibrium are based on a different definition of decision utility.
They reject the assumption that a person’s behavior reflects only the maximiz tion of his or
her own utility and promote the relevance of competing motives such as altruism, reciprocity,
and inequity aversion (Fehr and Camerer 2007).8 To be supported by process data, theories of
social preferences require that the information acquired by a player reflects hisor her social
motive. For example, a player motivated by fairness should look at the payoffs of others,
regardless of whether these payoffs are strategically relevant or not.
Process Data and Backward Induction
Equilibrium predictions made by game-theoretic models of sequential bargaining are typically
not supported by experimental results (Ochs and Roth 1989). In the literature, there are two
possible explanations of this phenomenon: the first is that players deviate from equilibrium
because of their limited cognition and the second is that players are inequity-averse or
want to reciprocate cooperation. These two alternative hypotheses were testedby Camerer
et al. (1993) and Johnson et al. (2002) by combining information-searchpatterns and
choices. Johnson et al. (2002) used mouse-laboratory to study backward inductio in three-
stage Rubinstein bargaining games (Figure 3.7). In their study, partici nts were asked
to acquire information about the pie size in different stages by clickingo the relative
boxes.9 Camerer et al. (1993) found that the offers ($2.11) were closer to the equalsplit
($2.50) than to the equilibrium prediction ($1.25). Their resultscould be explained by the
inability of the players to find the equilibrium via backward induction, by inequality aversion
(individuals dislike differences in final payoffs), or a combination of the two. Starting from
the evidence that the equilibrium model in sequential bargaining did not account for the
initial offers of the players, Camerer et al. (1993) used process data to understand whether
some of the implicit assumptions of the equilibrium model were violated. For example, to
compute a subgame perfect equilibrium offer players needed to open the secondand the
third boxes. If players did not open the third box they did not haveenough information
to compute an equilibrium offer. This simple line of reasoning suggested to Camerer
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Source: Adapted from Johnson et al. (2002).
Figure 3.7 Mouse-laboratory screenshot of the three-stage bargaining game
In their analysis, Camerer et al. (1993) compared the information acquisition process of
players who were trained to apply backward induction with that of untrainedplayers. They
found that trained players paid more attention to the second- and the third-round boxes,
and made more transitions between them. Moreover, untrained players did not co sider
information following the same order as trained players. They mostlyremained focused on
the boxes related to the current round and did not pay sufficient attention to information
about the subsequent rounds (for example, they did not open the second- and the third-round
boxes 19 percent and 10 percent of the time, respectively). These results showthat the search
pattern of untrained players differs from the search pattern expected from players who apply
backward induction.
To test whether players’ behavior is better explained by limited cognition or inequity
aversion, Johnson et al. (2002) classified players into different types,based on their search
patterns, and tested whether there was correspondence between how players allocateattention
and the decision rule adopted. Johnson et al. (2002) made the following predictions: they
expected level-0 players to remain focused on the first-round boxes, ignorin future rounds;
level-1 players to look one round ahead and open the second-round boxes; and equilibrium
players to open the third-round boxes and allocate their attention mostly t the second- and
third-round boxes. Johnson et al. (2002) found that the average offer f r each type of player
was close to that predicted by the level-k model. In particular, they found that the average
offer of players classified as level-0 ($2.07) was significantly higher thant of players
classified as level-1 ($1.71) and that the average offer of players classified asl vel-2 ($1.44)
was significantly lower than that of players classified as level-1. Importantly, theories of social
preferences could not explain these results because high offers were observedalso when the
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Process Data and Heterogeneity in Strategic Sophistication
Results obtained by Camerer et al. (1993) and Johnson et al. (2002) suggestthat heterogeneity
in search patterns leads to heterogeneity in players’ choices. This link was alsotre sed in
a mouse-laboratory experiment conducted by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) to study strategic
sophistication in one-shot normal form games (Figure 3.8). Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) tested
the cognitive implications of alternative models of choice combining choice data and patterns
of information search. To explain the behavior (choices and search patterns)of their players,
they specified a priori nine possible types of players. Four of their types were non-strategic
(or had diffused beliefs) since they did not require consideration of the incentives of the
counterpart to predict their decisions. Five of their types were strategic and required both
the formation of beliefs about the expected action of the counterpart and the correspondent
best-response to them. Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) assumed that each type first decides which
information search strategy to adopt, and then the information search strategy and the type
both determine the final decision. To describe the link between the decision process and
the choice, they associated each decision type with one (or more) search pattern(s). Despite
finding heterogeneity in both players’ behavior and lookup patterns, Cota-Gomes et al.
(2001) observed that most of their participants exhibited lookups andchoices consistent
with the level-k model. They found that about two-thirds of their participants exhibited
action choices and lookups patterns that were consistent with level-1 or level-2 models. The
Note: In this example, participants (the row players ‘You’) couldsee the payoffs one-by-one by left-clicking the
mouse cursor in correspondence to the gray boxes. It was possible for the participant to have only one box open at
a time. To open a new box or enter the decision, the participant h d to close the open box by right-clicking the
mouse cursor.
Source: Adapted from Costa-Gomes et al. (2001).
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dominance-1 model explained the behavior (choices and lookup patterns) ofmost of the
remaining participants.10
Mouse-tracking was used also by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) in a study where
they elicited players’ initial responses to a series of two-person guessing games. Similarly
to Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), they identified different types of players using an econometric
analysis and found that deviation from equilibrium could be predicted and explained assuming
a hierarchy of boundedly rational types.
Process Data in Games with Private Information
Brocas et al. (2014) investigated the link between information search and decision strategy
in games with private information. They used mouse laboratory to study strategic thinking in
two-person betting games with three states and two-sided private informati n (Figure 3.9).
They were interested in testing the predictions of two different classes of models. The
first class includes models which predict that a player fully analyzes the game but makes
imperfect inferences about the other player’s action or believes that the counterpart made
imperfect inferences about his or her own action (models of this type include the QRE, the
CE and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium). The second class of models assumes that
players sometimes have imperfect attention and ignore relevant informatin because of their
bounded rationality (as in level-k and cognitive hierarchy theories).
Brocas et al. (2014) used a model-based clustering method to group participants according
to their lookup patterns and choices. They found three clusters which approximately corre-
sponded to level-3, level-2 and level-1 players, and a fourth cluster which included players
who fully analyzed the game but made inferential mistakes. More generally, the found
that deviations from Nash equilibrium were usually associated with failure to look at the
relevant information and that the choices of the players could be predicted by the time they
spent looking at relevant payoffs.
Note: The left-hand panel is a screenshot of the game as seen by the participants in the experiment. The right-hand
panel is an example of the game with displayed payoff. The game included three possible states
(A, B and C). The computer selected randomly one of the three stat s and each respondent privately observed a
state partition (either one or two of the three states). For example, player 1 knew that the state was A or B or knew
that the state was C for sure. Player 2 knew that the state was Afor sure, or B or C. The respondent chose whether
to bet or accept an outside option (sure payoff).
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Process Data and Deception in Games
Process data were recorded to study deception in games. Wang et al. (2010) recorded
eye-tracking and pupil dilation data in a sender–receiver game. The sender–receiver game
represents a typical economic situation in which two players (the sender andthe receiver) have
different interests: the sender is incentivized to send a message to the receivthat exaggerates
the truth, and the receiver is incentivized to infer correctly the true statefrom the message of
the sender. However, there is evidence that the sender usually tells the trut more often than
equilibrium predicts. Wang et al. argue that over-communication can be explained by a level-k
model in which the behavior of a level-0 sender is anchored at the truth telling. In their analysis
of eye movements, they showed that level-0 players (both senders and receive s) focused
mainly on the payoffs corresponding to the true state. Conversely, the lookup patterns of
level-1 and level-2 players were focused more on the payoffs corresponding to the true
state plus a known bias parameter that depended on the level-type and the state-action
combination. Wang et al. (2010) also investigated the underlying cognitive processes of over-
communication by recording the senders’ pupil dilation during the period in which they sent
the message. They found that senders’ pupils dilate when they sent messages th t diverged
from the true state and that the pupil dilation increased more when the deception had larger
magnitude. These results show the predictive power of lookups and pupil dilation for inferring
private state information.
Process Data and Social Preferences
The studies described up to now show how process data can be used to characterizeplayers in
terms of their ability to do different steps of iterative strategic thinking. Jiang et al. (2016)
showed that, in certain strategic contexts, process data can also be used to characterize
the social preferences of players. They started from the assumption that ifan individual
is motivated by a particular social preference, the way in which information is acquired
should reveal that social preference. In their study, eye movements were recorded while
participants played a simple three-person (dictator) distribution game. The choices in the
game could be characterized according to three different types of social motives:efficiency
(maximize the sum of the payoffs), maximin (maximize the minimum payoff) and envy
(minimize the difference between the highest payoff of a player and the payoff of the dictator
player). The participants performed a preference-based decision-making task in which they
were free to adopt the decision strategy they prefer. Then, they performed a second task in
which they were instructed and incentivized to choose according to each of the three possible
decision rules (Figure 3.10). In the analysis, players were first classified according to their
choices and then according to their information search patterns when making preference-
based decisions. Patterns were characterized based on two types of variables: gaze time and
saccades.
The first type of variable (gaze time) referred to the time spent lookingat the payoffs
of person one, two, and three. The second type (saccades) referred to the comparis ns
made by the respondent and included saccades within rows (eye movements between two
allocations of the same person), saccades between rows (eye movements withinthe same
allocation of two different persons) and saccades within areas of interest (eyemov ments
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Note: The lines and circles depict saccades and fixations respectively. The diameter of the circles is proportional to
the fixation duration.
Figure 3.10 Example adapted from Jiang et al. (2016) in which the respondent was
instructed to choose according to one of three possible decision rules
by the participants while choosing according to the three decision rulesas a template to
predict the decision strategy adopted by the players when making preference-based decisions.
Finally they compared the level of correspondence of the two classifications (one based on
eye movements and the other based on choices). The results show that the classification based
on eye movements leads to accurate predictions of players’ choices, supporting the idea that
choices are strictly related to the specific information search analysis adoptedby the player.
Process Data and Subjective Levels of Strategic Sophistication and Social Preferences
In the studies described up to now, process data was used mostly to investigate eparately
strategic sophistication and social preferences, though it is likely thatdeviation from
equilibrium can be owing to both aspects. In relation to this, the study of Polonio et al. (2015)
started from the assumption that the strategy adopted by a player dependson two components:
the player’s level of sophistication and social motive. Following this t eoretical framework,
Polonio et al. (2015) conducted an eye-tracking study in which participants played two-
person, two-by-two, one-shot normal form games. They tested whether the decision strategy
implemented by the players could be described and predicted by the visual searchpatterns
they used to acquire information about the game structure. To define thesearch patterns,
Polonio et al. (2015) identified a subset of informative saccades that were considered useful for
capturing pieces of information about the games. Informative saccades included: (1) saccades









































Note: On the left-hand side is a player who compared his or her own payoffs with those of the counterpart within
the four cells. In the middle, a player who remained focused on his or her own payoffs. On the right-hand side, a
player with distributed attention who consider iteratively his or her own and his or her counterpart’s payoffs. The
lines indicate the saccades (that is, eye movements from onefixation to the next), and the circles the fixation
location.
Source: Adapted from Polonio et al. (2015).
Figure 3.11 Eye-tracking data from three column players
highest average payoffs (for the player and the counterpart); and (iii) comparing the payoffs
of the two players within the same cell.
Polonio et al. (2015) found that different groups of players used specific combinations of
informative saccades in order to implement their decision strategies. Theyfound two groups
of participants who neglected information that was needed to best respond tothe c unterpart.
In one group, participants simply compared their own payoffs with those of the counterpart
within the four cells. In the other, participants focused their attention on their own payoffs.
However, they also found a third group of participants who took into account the payoffs of
the counterpart using an iterative step-by-step procedure. These participants looked first at
their own payoffs, then at the payoffs of the counterpart, and then again at their own payoffs
(Figure 3.11). Participants who compared their own payoffs with those of the counterpart were
classified as cooperative or competitive players. Participants focused on their own payoffs
were classified as level-1 players and participants with distributed attention as level-2 players.
Using this classification based on visual search patterns, Polonio et al. (2015) were able to
predict the choices of the four groups of players in games with different equilibrium structures.
These results support the idea that players use stable decision strategies that can be identified
with precision by looking at the information acquisition patterns. Ia subsequent analysis, it
was established that equilibrium choices in the two-by-two matrix games were made when the
information acquisition followed a specific temporal pattern. Accordingto the data, deviations
from this specific temporal pattern led to out-of-equilibrium choices (Figure 3.12).
The results of Polonio et al. (2015) are supported by another eye-tracking study, con-
ducted by Devetag et al. (2016). They showed that in two-person, three-by-three, one-
shot games players adopt simplified strategies such as ‘choosing the actionwi h the
highest average payoff’ or ‘the action leading to an attractive and symmetric payoff’.11
They found that many players did not take into account the other players’ incentives or
considered the other player’s payoffs only for a subset of game outcomes.Th analysis of
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Note: Panel A shows data for equilibrium choices. At the beginningof a trial, participants considered their own
payoffs (first 4 saccades). Then, they looked at the other player’s payoffs (saccades 4–9) and, finally, before making
a decision, they looked again at own payoffs (saccades 10–16). Panel B shows the data for non-equilibrium choices.
This demonstrates that in order to make an equilibrium choice a ertain pattern of analysis should be followed.
Source: Adapted from Polonio et al. (2015).
Figure 3.12 The average proportions of saccades (across games) thatoccurred between
player’s own payoffs (own), between counterpart’s payoffs (other) and
between own and counterpart’s payoffs (intra-cell) over time
by the players and the strategy adopted. They found that the lookup patterns of the players
were heterogeneous but very stable.12 Moreover, it was found that the prototypical visual
search pattern adopted by each type of player is not affected by the type of game orby the
presence of descriptive features (that is, ‘features that can be changed withoutaltering the
game equilibrium properties’; Devetag 2016, abstract). Finally, it wasfound that one-third
of the players chose according to focal payoffs and used information acquisition patterns
that differ from those expected under the assumptions of the level-k model. The behavior of
these players, as well as their visual search pattern, was similar to that of cooperative players
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Process Data and the Analysis of Consistency between Choices and Beliefs in Games
In a similar experiment, Polonio and Coricelli (2019) used eye-tracking technique to identify
possible causes of inconsistency between choices and beliefs in games. In theirstudy,
participants played a set of two player, three-by-three, one-shot games (choice task) and
stated their beliefs about which action they expect their counterpart to play (beliefs elicitation
task). Polonio and Coricelli (2019) classified participants into different types according
to the pattern of visual analysis they used when playing the games and when stating
their beliefs. Then, they tested for each type of player, the degree to whichc oices were
consistent with stated beliefs. They found that participants classified as level-2 used a
more sophisticated pattern of visual analysis when they were choosing their actions than
when they were stating their beliefs, as if they were best responding to the belief that
their counterpart was less sophisticated than themselves. This hypothesiswas supported by
the finding that their choices were highly consistent with their stated beliefs. Conversely,
participants classified as level-1 or as having social preferences disregarded information
which was necessary to find a best response to their stated beliefs. Polonio and Coricelli
(2019) found that their choices and beliefs were generally inconsistent. They concluded that
there are two main reasons why individuals do not best respond to their beliefs in games.
Some individuals take into account the incentives of the counterpart whenstati g their
beliefs, but not when choosing their actions (level-1 players). Others do not attempt to best
respond to the expected action of the counterpart, but want to find a cooperative solution
of the game (cooperative players). These findings have important implications for non-
equilibrium models, such as level-k (Stahl and Wilson 1994, 1995; Nagel 1995) and cognitive
hierarchy models (Camerer et al. 2004), since they show that individuals who e choices
were consistent with the level-1 model did not assign equal probability to all counterparts’
actions (as expected for level-0 players) but stated that the level-1 action is chosen much more
frequently.
Process Data and Learning in Games
Process data can be useful also for testing different models of learning in games. Knoepfle
et al. (2009) tested different learning theories assuming that each theory can bethought of
as an information search algorithm that uses specific information about pastactions and
payoff to guide choices. In this instance, eye-tracking data are particularly useful since
choices alone cannot clearly distinguish among alternative learning rules. Unfortunately,
Knoepfle et al. (2009) did not find any learning rule that is supported byboth choices and
information search patterns. When they considered eye-tracking data, they found that players
look more at information that is relevant for sophisticated models (inwhich players anticipate
that their counterpart is learning) as compared to information that is relevant for adaptive
models (in which players learn by generalized reinforcing). However, when thy analyzed
players’ choices they found that adaptive models predict players’ behaviormore precisely
than sophisticated models. They conclude that a learning model that can explin both choices
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CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we described some research on process tracing in behavioral game theory.
We provided some examples and some critical comments about the methodology in use.
Experimentation in economics has reached a very high standard and a vast range of
applications. Process tracing analysis represents a new frontier. We believe that process
tracing approaches can contribute significantly to a better understanding ofthe cognitive and
the emotional underpinnings of economic decision making, from how people evaluate the
outcomes of their choices to how they form beliefs about what other people might do.
NOTES
*. The study was funded by the European Research Council (ERCConsolidator Grant 617629).
1. For example, if the action space is between 0 and 100, then equilibrium contribution is higher than 0 and less
than 100.
2. Gill and Prowse (2017) find that fast decision makers are less efficient in games. However, they also report that
overthinking can lead to bad choices.
3. A good example of this distinction is the evidence of social and anti-social punishment reported in Herrmann
et al. (2008). In this study, Herrmann et al. (2008) find that in Western societies punishing free riders in
repeated PG is prevalent, while in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, Russia and Greece a non-negligible
proportion of subjects use anti-social punishment to punish cooperators. This suggests that cooperators in these
societies are seen as norm breakers.
4. This strand of literature is remarkably close in flavor to the unitary system view discussed previously. Rustichini
(2008) argues that the resolution of the conflict between dual and unitary theories may lie in their synthesis.
5. Similar results were obtained by Suter and Hertwig (2011)who studied moral judgment: there were more
deontological than consequentialist choices under time pressure, which in the strategic settings correspond to
selfish and social behavior.
6. Velocity and acceleration are indexes of the degree of response competition at different time points (Hehman
et al. 2015).
7. Quantal response equilibrium is also called the trembling-hand effect because people would make errors in the
decision phase.
8. In some cases also competition and punishment.
9. Equilibrium predictions are typically rejected in this strategic setting.
10. Dominance-1 players assign equal probability to the opponent’s undominated actions and zero probability to
the remaining dominated ones.
11. The first strategy is expected of a level-1 player, whereas the second one is expected of a cooperative player.
12. The lookup pattern of each participant did not change much from trial to trial.
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